Less than fifteen years ago, Turkey has experienced a financial collapse which many economic articles assumed to stem from high inflation rate or the impact of the international crisis. However, a deeper analysis shows that the main problem was a poor condition of public finances and banks, which still belonged to the state. In 2000, before the beginning of the crisis, state banks capital adequacy ratio was around 7.9% and non-performing loans constituted 11.3% of the total portfolio. There were simply in bad condition compare to other countries. State-owned banks in Turkey reached 35% share of the market while Poland in 2000 reached 22% share of the market. In 2001 Turkish banks lost their liquidity, the main cause of the crisis was a cut in the line of credit for smaller banks by the largest Turkish banks. The Turkish crisis of 2001 showed plenty of mistakes in the economic policy which were made by Turkey from 1920 until 2000. Not only led it to the destabilization of the financial and political situation and panic on the financial markets but it also cost the private sector 9.5 billion USD (6.4% of GDP) and the State Treasury lost much more, i.e. 43.7 billion USD (29.5% of GDP) [NOTE]. The milestone in reducing the crisis was 15 May 2001 when Kemel Dervis became the Minister of Economic Affairs. He introduced a new economic program with the support of IMF and World Bank which introduced changes in the banking sector. The program envisaged the establishment of an independent central bank, structural reforms, depoliticization, commercialization and restructuring. The government finally began to use the same standards for private and state banks. However, the changes introduced after 2000 were impermanent. Under the influence of AKP's success and the growing confidence of the leading party, the government started to look for shortcuts, i.e. Turkish government did not finisz privatization of the banks which are still in possession of the state (about 42% of total deposits).